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Casenote
Birnbaum Rejected:
Expansion of the Standing
Requirement Under Rule 10b-5
Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973).
As a general rule, only purchasers or sellers of securities have
standing to sue under Rule 10b-5 1 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. Since the rule was first articulated in Birnbaum v. New-
port Steel Corp.,2 its literal application has been rare3 and it has
'been emasculated to such an extent that it is virtually non-existent
in some jurisdictions. 4 Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,5
is the first decision expressly to reject Birnbaum's standing limita-
tion and its precedential value has been somewhat cemented by the
1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973). The rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce,
or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities
exchange,
(a) To employ any devise, scheme or artifice to defraud,(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances un-
der which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security. (Emphasis added.)
2. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
3. Compare Tully v. Mott Supermarkets Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834 (D.N.J.
1972) with Mount Clemens Industries, Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th
Cir. 1972). Tully expresses a view that may be regarded as typical
of the current trend. The court showed dismay at any argument
which attempts to "revive the spectre of the Birnbaum buyer-seller
doctrine at a point in time when both courts and legal scholars are
seeking to bury it." Id. at 839. For other examples of the various
circuit court views of the purchaser-seller limitation, see notes 27, 31,
33 infra and accompanying text.
4. Tully v. Mott Supermarkets Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834 (D.N.J. 1972); Vine
v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 970 (1967).
5. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1979 (1974).
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defendants' failure to obtain certification of the issue.
The plaintiffs in Eason were shareholders in Bank Service Cor-
poration, an enterprise which sought to purchase an automobile
dealership-leasing company. In exchange for the seller's business,
Bank Service agreed to issue a substantial number of its own shares
and assume liabilities in the form of notes payable to GMAC, the
seller's inventory financer. The plaintiffs individually guaranteed
the notes and future liabilities payable to GMAC.
The newly-acquired business failed, Bank Service defaulted on
the notes and GMAC sued the plaintiffs as guarantors. The plain-
tiffs countered with a 10b-5 action against GMAC and the seller,
alleging that they had been defrauded in connection with the pur-
chase and sale of securities. According to the plaintiffs, the dealer-
ship had been doomed to failure because of its unsound financial
condition, a fact allegedly concealed by GMAC during the course
of negotiations.6 Had it not been for material mistatements on the
part of the seller and GMAC, Bank Service would not have pur-
chased the dealership.
In order to satisfy the purchaser-seller requirement of Birn-
baum, the plaintiffs claimed they were constructive sellers of the
Bank Service shares, that their individual guarantees were secu-
rities, and that the notes themselves were securities. 7 Alternatively,
6. It is not clear why the dealership was doomed to failure. See Brief
for Appellants at 9, Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490
F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), where these allegations (set forth in the
plaintiffs' third amended complaint) were assumed true for the pur-
poses of determining the issue of standing. 490 F.2d at 656.
7. The plaintiffs' alternative theories appear to be well within accepted
interpretations of the Birnbaum rule, see notes 29, 30 and 32 and ac-
companying text infra, with the exception of the theory which would
classify the notes themselves as securities. For an interesting discus-
sion of when notes may be classified as securities, see Comment, Com-
mercial Notes and Definition of 'Security' Under Securities Exchange
Act of 1934: A Note is a Note is a Note?, 52 NEB. L. REv. 478 (1973).
Normally the plaintiffs could have sued derivatively, enforcing the
rights of Bank Service. Apparently, this approach was precluded by
the failure to make a proper demand upon the corporation. See Reply
Brief for Appellants at 21, Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
supra note 5.
The fact that the court was presented with several means of allow-
ing standing, yet chose to ignore the common principle that courts will
decide an issue on the narrowest ground possible, supports the view
that Eason may have been nothing more than a challenge to the Su-
preme Court to reassess the Birnbaum Rule. Additional support for
this proposition is found in an unexplainable note included in the
opinion: "This opinion has been circulated to all judges in regular ac-
tive service; no judge has requested that the case be reheard en banc."
490 F.2d at 661, n.31.
RULE 10b-5
they asked that the Birnbaum rule be discarded, urging that there
was no vitality remaining in it.8
Despite GMAC's arguments to the contrary,9 the Eason court
discarded the rule, opting for a more flexible standing requirement
which determines the propriety of a 10b-5 action 'by looking to
whether the plaintiff is an investor, injured as a result of fraud
in a securities transaction.'0 The court determined that giving Rule
10b-5 a broad and flexible construction 1 necessarily resulted in ex-
8. This purchase-seller requirement was a judicially-imposed
limitation and does not flow from the language of the statute
or the rule. The statute and rule prohibit any person from
doing certain acts 'in connection with' purchases and sales
'which would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.'
They speak in the negative. They proscribe actions. These
proscriptions, to repeat the language of the Supreme Court
. . . 'are broad and, by repeated use of the word 'any' are ob-
viously intended to be inclusive.'
Brief for Appellants at 22, Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
note 5 supra.
9. GMAC first argued that the purchaser-seller standing limitation of
Birnbaum is constitutionally compelled, relying upon Herpich v. Wal-
lace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970). The court rejected this argument,
stating that constitutional requirements were satisfied so long as the
plaintiffs were members of a class to be protected by 10b-5 and their
complaint insured a real and adverse interest apart from that of the
defendant. The court rejected earlier interpretations of Birnbaum
which held that 10b-5 claims were insufficient in a constitutional and
jurisdictional sense unless the plaintiff had suffered an injury which
was cognizable under the rule. "Instead of stating the issue in terms
of standing, we think it is more useful to ask whether the plaintiffs
were members of the class for whose special benefit Rule 10b-5 was
adopted." 490 F.2d at 658.
GMAC next argued that a loosening of standing requirements un-
der 10b-5 would propagate an unmanageable flood of litigation. Eason
determined, however, that increased litigation due to a relaxation of
the standing requirements was purely speculative and that such a fear
was, more likely than not, prompted by a belief that the species of
fraud to be proved under lob-5 was always easier to prove than com-
mon law fraud. The court felt that this was an unwarranted belief.
490 F.2d at 660. This offhand dismissal seems to fly in the face of
the unquestionable ease of proving fraud available to prospective 10b-5
plaintiffs. See Lanza v. Drexel, 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
Finally GMAC argued that the Birnbaum standing requirement
should be maintained in the interest of preserving a national consist-
ency in securities litigation. Eason, however, charged that task to the
Supreme Court. 490 F.2d at 661.
10. "Thus, the statutory authorization for the rule refers to the prohibition
of deceptive devices 'for the protection of investors.'" 490 F.2d at 659.
11. The court felt that flexible construction was mandated by the decision
of the Supreme Court in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
"[A] formal purchaser-seller limitation is not consistent with the over-
riding requirement that, in construing the 1934 Act, 'form should be
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tending the protection of the rule to investors as a class, the legis-
lators' intended beneficiaries. 12 According to the reasoning in
Eason, all investors are members of the class to be benefited by
the rule.
To some extent, the court felt compelled to reach its conclusion
because of the Supreme Court's decision in Superintendent of In-
surance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.' 3 The court in that case
was also presented the opportunity to rule on the propriety of the
Birnbaum doctrine. Bankers Life involved a clever manipulation
by a hopeful purchaser of Manhattan Casualty Company who
floated the purchase price with the company's assets. 14 The pur-
chaser induced a trust company to issue a large check without col-
lateral. The check was given to Banker's Life in payment for Man-
hattan and, concomitantly, the purchaser caused all of Manhattan's
treasury bonds to be sold. The proceeds were used to cover the
check. Too thinly capitalized, Manhattan ended up in the charge
of the Superintendent of Insurance. Although the sale of the treas-
ury bonds was untainted, the Court held that fraud had been per-
petrated "in connection with" the sale and was therefore actionable.
The Eason court found significance in Bankers Life. "[T] he basic
holding of Birnbaum was repudiated ,by a unanimous Supreme
Court in the Bankers Life case. We are convinced that the pur-
chaser-seller limitation is nothing more than an appendage to that
holding without independent justification."' 5
It is important to note that the actual holding in Birnbaum was
twofold. In addition to the purchaser-seller limitation, Birnbaum
also limited the scope of fraud cognizable under Rule 10b-5 by rul-
ing that it must be that type which is "usually associated with the
purchase or sale of a security.""' The Bankers Life Court com-
mented that fraud cognizable under 10b-5 should include deceptive
practices that "touch" an "investor's" sale of a security, thus paving
the way for lOb-5 coverage of issues that have heretofore been rele-
gated to common law determination.' 7 Evidently the Eason court
disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on the economic
reality.'" 490 F.2d at 659.
12. 490 F.2d at 659. Birnbaum expressly rejected the idea that the phrase
"any person in connection with the purchase or sale" described the
rule's protected class. See, Note, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (1952).
13. 404 U.S. 6 (1971), rev'g 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970).
14. For an excellent discussion of the complex fact pattern in Bankers
Life, see Ryan, Bankers Life: Birnbaum Reconsidered, 4 LOYOLA
U.L.J. 47 (1973).
15. 490 F.2d at 661.
16. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952).
17. The Court in Bankers Life avoided the procedural holding of Birn-
baum, viz., that 10b-5 plaintiffs must qualify as purchasers or sellers
RULE 10b-5
reasoned that broadening the scope of actionable fraud under 10b-5
apodictically results in a dilution of the standing requirement,
Perhaps the court read too much into the phrase "touch" an "in-
vestor."'19 On the other hand, it is possible that the court's logic
and rationale were merely a facade, and the real purpose of the
decision was to tempt the Supreme Court into revisiting the issue.
Securities practitioners will undoubtedly raise an eyebrow at the
Eason decision. Some of the imminent skepticism may be caused
by the court's obvious reliance on Bankers Life, a decision which
unquestionably did not alter the existing status of Birnbaum's
standing requirements. 20 Others are sure to question the propriety
of the decision in light of the Third Circuit's recent affirmation
of the Birnbaum doctrine,2 1 a decision that was also based on an
interpretation of Bankers Life. Still others will protest what ap-
pears to be yet another expansion of the scope of Rule 10b-5.22
of securities, and dealt only with the scope of fraud cognizable under
lOb-5.
Interestingly, Justice Douglas noted: "[W]e express no opinion as
to [the injured investor's] standing under § 10b and Rule 10b-5 on
other phases of the complaint." 404 U.S. at 13, n.10. The import is
less clear than it would first appear to be. On the one hand, Bankers
Life can be read as an express affirmation of Birnbaum. See, Landy
v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973) and
Ryan, Bankers Life: Birnbaum Reconsidered, 4 LoYouA U.L.J. 47(1973). Quite another interpretation is possible, however. The reluc-
tance of the court to deal with standing specifically may mean that
the court was satisfied with the current interpretations of Birnbaum.
18. There is some merit in this conclusion. See 2 A. BROMBERG, SEcURI-
TEs LAw-FPAuD-SEC RULE 10b-5 § 4.7(565) (1973) [hereinafter
cited as BRO MBERG].
19. It is doubtful that Justice Douglas intended such an impact from such
a phrase, especially in light of his explicit reluctance to deal with
standing. See note 17 supra.
20. Id.
21. Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973). Landy also looked to
the decision in Bankers Life and reached a conclusion totally incon-
sistent with Eason:
We conclude, however, that permitting a cause of action to
these plaintiffs would not be in keeping with the Congres-
sional purpose in enacting section 10(b); nor is it required by
the interpretation in Bankers Life. When Congress enacted
section 10(b), it did not contemplate the protection of every
person injured by a fraudulent scheme in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities. Its immediate concern was the
protection of the purety of the informational system in the se-
curities market.
Id. at 157. The court neatly forgot to mention that the plaintiffs were
"investors" within the meaning of the Bankers Life language. See
note 17 supra.
22. It has been suggested that lOb-5 has already been over expanded.
Some cynically suggest that lOb-5 is so expansive that its present ap-
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Potential critics of Eason should ponder the result in light of
the existing decisional law in involving Rule 10b-5 standing require-
ments. It may well be that Eason does nothing more than codify
existing practice-a practice which exists despite the formal pre-
requisites of Birnbaum. Eason's holding, in broad terms, coheres
nicely with the position maintained by the SEC in numerous amicus
briefs.23  In a nutshell, the SEC maintains that Rule 10b-5 was
promulgated for the protection of stockholders, and when stock-
holders are injured as a result of fraud in securities transactions,
they should be allowed to sue.24 It is important to note that the
SEC's position does not dispense with the requirement of a sale,
rather, it rejects the assumption that a proper plaintiff must be
on either end of a sale.25
This basic philosophy is not confined to the Seventh Circuit.
The demise of the Birnbaum doctrine began long before the decision
in Eason and its existence has long been a sore spot with commen-
tators.26 Exceptions to Birnbaum began with the decision of Mu-
tual Shares Corp. v. Genesco.2 7 There the Second Circuit de-
termined that a strict purchaser-seller status should not be required
where the suit sought injunctive relief. In effect, the court rea-
soned that shareholders have authority to act as "enforcement
agents" in halting fraudulent practices in securities transactions. 28
plication would permit a buyer of stock to sue the seller when the
price goes down; the seller could sue the buyer if the price were to
go up; and each could sue the other for interest if the price were to
remain the same. Marsh, What Lies Ahead Under Rule 10b-5?, 24
Bus. LAw. 69 (1968).
23. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. of New York v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), rev'g 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970), and Drach-
man v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1972). The SEC protested the
stringent adherence to Birnbaum in both decisions. More recently, the
SEC has urged that Eason become the precedent for a wholesale rejec-
tion of Birnbaum. BNA SEC. REr. L. REP. (April 24, 1974 No. 249).
24. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 7 n.6, Superintendent of Ins. v.
Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), rev'g 430 F.2d 355 (2d
Cir. 1970).
25. See, Ryan, Bankers Life: Birnbaum Reconsidered, 4 LOYOLA U.L.J.
47,48 (1973).
26. Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 725
(1956); Comment, The Purchase-Seller Rule: An Archaic Tool for
Determining Standing under Rule 10b-5, 56 GEO. L.J. 1177 (1968); Case
Comment, Standing of Private Parties to Vindicate the Public Interest,
50 B.U.L. Rxv. 417 (1970).
27. 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967). Although Mutual Shares is traditionally
cited for this proposition, the exception first appears to have been rec-
ognized in Ruckle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
28. "[T] he claim for damages ... founders both on proof of loss and the
causal connection with the alleged violation of the Rule; on the other
hand, the claim for injunctive relief largely avoids these issues, may
RULE 10b-5
According to Genesco there is propriety in allowing an individual
to vindicate public rights; regardless of their lack of formal stand-
ing, individuals have an interest in maintaining the sanctity of the
securities markets.
Courts have further diluted the Birnbaum doctrine by classify-
ing numerous kinds of transactions as "sales' Issuance of a corpo-
ration's own shares 29 and mergers 30 have been termed "sales" for
the purpose of circumventing the Birnbaum limitation. In this way
courts have conferred purchaser-seller status upon hopeful plain-
tiffs in an ad hoc fashion, looking to the equities of each specific
fact pattern and determining the transaction's true substance and
effect, regardless of its form. This process is consistent with the
"flexible interpretation" of 10b-5 suggested by the Supreme Court.3 1
Notwithstanding this flexible approach, the courts have felt obli-
gated to pledge formal allegiance to Birnbaum's procedural prin-
ciples. An appearance of consistency is assured by the use of yet
another alternative: the constructive purchaser-seller concept.3,2
Plaintiffs are clothed with the status of a purchaser or seller by
broadening the concept of purchase and sale. Courts interpreted
these terms more broadly than would be required in the commercial
law context.
3 3
The result of flexibly interpreting the concept of sale has been
a near total emasculation of the purchaser-seller limitation. As
cure harm suffered by continuing shareholders, and would afford com-
plete relief against the Rule 1Ob-5 violation for the future." Mutual
Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 547 (2d Cir. 1967). Note-
worthy is the significance that the court attaches to the causation issue.
See also note 39 infra and accompanying text.
29. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 906 (1968); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
30. Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 970 (1967).
31. Note 11 supra.
32. See A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); Vine v.
Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
970 (1967); Dasho v. Susquenhanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
33. Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. de-
nied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967). Looking to the broad language of the 34
Act, the court in Dasho said:
This broad language indicates an intention by Congress that
the words 'purchase' and 'sale' are not limited to transactions
ordinarily governed by the commercial law of sales. The pur-
pose is evidently to make control of securities transactions
reasonably complete and effective to accomplish the purposes
of the legislation.
Id. at 266.
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Professor Bromberg notes: "the buyer-seller condition has been
stretched by broad interpretation to include almost any shareholder
affected by a corporate transaction.13 4
Although commentators have attempted to explain away the nu-
merous exceptions to Birnbaum,3 5 the fact remains that not all of
the circuit court theories may be reconciled with any consistently
uniform approach. The manifold approaches to 10b-5 standing do,
however, suggest one universal principle: courts are relatively un-
happy with the purchaser-seller limitation.3 6
Recently courts have assessed standing in terms of causation,
allowing a suit to be maintained so long as the plaintiff can estab-
lish a nexus between his loss and the alleged fraud.3 7 It makes sense
to confer standing, irrespective of "purchaser" or "seller" labels,
upon a plaintiff who can show causation.
In some situations a showing of causation is not essential to re-
lief. For example, requests for injunctive relief are allowed with-
out regard to the question of standing because "'[i] t is not neces-
sary in a suit for equitable or prophylactic relief to establish all
the elements required in a suit for monetary damages.' "138 Ar-
guably, whether the suit seeks injunctive relief or not, if causation
can be easily demonstrated, a court should likewise be unaffected
by "purchaser" or "seller" status. Moreover, the purchaser-seller
requirement itself can be seen as a form of the test.39 Arguably,
34. 2 BROMBERG C 8.8 p.22 2.
35. See e.g., Whitaker, The Birnbaum Doctrine: An Assessment, 23 AIA. L.
REV. 543 (1971).
36. See Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834 (D.N.J. 1972).
In Tully the court made continuing references to the fact that neither
§ 10b nor Rule 10b-5 contains language which limits the scope of those
provisions to actual purchasers or sellers.
The limitation on standing to sue which defendants seek
to impose is nowhere to be found in the language of either
Section 10b or Rule 10b-5. To imply such a requirement
ignores the recent edict by the Supreme Court mandating a
flexible as opposed to a technical or restrictive construction
of the Rule.
Id. at 839. See also, Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 171 (3d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970).
37. See Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 171 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 950 (1970) and 1 BROMBERG § 4.7 (565). It has been pointed
out that the purchaser-seller requirement helps to ensure a finding of
causation. Whitaker, The Birnbaum Doctrine: An Assessment, 23
ALA. L. REv. 543 (1971). Such an argument seems to put the cart be-
fore the horse. So long as a plaintiff can demonstrate that he suffered
injury which was caused by proscribed conduct, he should be brought
within the ambit of the rule.
38. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 547 (2d Cir. 1967).
39. 1 BROMBERG § 4.7 (565); Kahan v- Rosenstiel, 424 F,2d 161, 171 (3d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970).
RULE 10b-5
Eason recognized this principle when it held that one may properly
bring a 10b-5 suit when he suffers a wrong touching him as an
investor.
With such expansive interpretation of the standing limitation,
it is little wonder that a court finally elected to dispense with for-
malistic adherence to Birnbaum. Eason obviously recognized that
the numerous legal fictions employed have swallowed the rule. As
the SEC noted, it makes little sense to allow an individual to halt
fradulent activity in an injunctive suit without also allowing him
to prove damages that are the result of it.40 It would appear from
the present state of disarray in the circuit courts41 that it is only
a matter of time before Eason's lead is adopted and Birnbaum is
finally laid to rest.
Dennis A. Graham, '75
40. BNA SEc. REG. L. REP. (April 24, 1974 No. 249).
41. While the unofficial score shows all the circuits, save the seventh,
formally adopting the Birnbaum principle, standing is not per se lim-
ited to purchasers and sellers. Broad concepts of "sale" have been ap-
plied in the Second, Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits by Vine v. Benefi-
cial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970;
Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Mader v. Armel, 402
F.2d 158 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969); Mount
Clemons Indus., Inc. v. O.M. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972); and
Knauff v. Utah Constr. and Mining Co., 408 F.2d 958 (10th Cir. 1969),
respectively. On the other hand, the Third Circuit has taken an unus-
ually hard line in maintaining the Birnbaum requirement. See Landy
v. FDIC, 46 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973). Causation as a means of deter-
mining standing has been dressed in different clothes and recently
been applied in the Fifth Circuit under the guise of "privity," or lack
thereof. Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1974).
